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Risk Aversion and Compliance in Markets for Pollution Control

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for
pollution control. A firm’s decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager’s risk
preference. However, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations
than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. The violations of noncompliant firms
with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions and
their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers’ utility functions exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when
managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or decreasing in profit
levels. Finally, in the equilibrium of a market for emissions rights with widespread
noncompliance, risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental
quality, and lower aggregate violations.
Keywords: Emissions Trading, Compliance, Enforcement, Risk Aversion

1. Introduction
One of the most important design elements of any regulatory policy is how compliance to the
policy will be enforced. Within the context of designing market-based pollution control policies,
several authors have provided theoretical analyses of compliance incentives, the consequences of
noncompliance, and the design of enforcement strategies (e.g., Keeler 1991, Malik 1990, 1992,
and 2002, vanEgteren and Weber 1996, Stranlund and Dhanda 1999, Stranlund and Chavez
2000, Chavez and Stranlund 2003, Stranlund, Costello and Chavez 2005). Taken as a whole, this
literature suggests that firms’ incentives toward noncompliance under market-based regulations,
as well as the design of enforcement strategies to counteract these incentives, are quite different
from compliance and enforcement of other policy instruments, particularly command-andcontrol regulations.
An important question for enforcers of environmental policies is whether differences in
the characteristics of firms generate different compliance choices. One may suspect that firms
with different production processes, abatement technologies, or initial allocations of emissions
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rights may have different compliance incentives. If this is true, then regulators will be motivated
to choose a targeted enforcement strategy, in particular targeted monitoring effort, which is
conditioned on firm-level characteristics.
However, Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) have shown that the individual compliance
choices of risk neutral competitive firms in emissions trading programs are independent of
differences in any firm-level characteristic. Consequently, regulators have no reason to condition
their enforcement effort on firm-level characteristics. Their reasoning is straightforward. Since
compliance in emissions trading programs means that a firm holds enough permits to cover its
emissions, a risk neutral competitive firm’s marginal benefit of noncompliance is what it has to
spend for permits to make sure it is compliant; that is, the prevailing permit price. A firm’s
compliance decision is made by comparing this permit price with the marginal expected penalty
for emissions in excess of permits. Since this marginal benefit-cost comparison does not depend
on anything unique to a particular firm, the compliance decision is independent of any firm
characteristic.
This independence result contrasts sharply with the effects of firm-level characteristics on
compliance with command-and-control standards, under which firms with higher marginal
emissions control costs or that face stricter emissions standards will have a greater incentive to
be noncompliant. In this way, firm-level characteristics are important determinants of
compliance with fixed standards (Garvie and Keeler 1994). A recent paper by Gray and
Shadbegian (2005) finds strong support for this conclusion in their analysis of compliance
behavior by pulp and paper manufacturers.
The independence of firms’ violation choices on their individual characteristics under
market-based regulations clearly depends, at least in part, on the assumption of risk-neutrality.
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However, no one has addressed the question of whether this independence result holds with riskaverse decision makers. In the theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions
trading only Malik (1990) allows for non-neutral risk preferences. However, he does not provide
the qualitative impacts of firms’ benefits from emissions (i.e., emissions control costs) or their
initial allocations of permits on violation choices. Doing so is the primary objective of this paper.
Moreover, since market-based regulations are unique in that the compliance decisions of firms
are linked together through the market for property rights, it is important to understand how risk
aversion affects equilibrium decisions and market outcomes.
Several new results about compliance behavior under tradable property rights policies are
derived in this paper. After laying out a model of a firm’s compliance decisions under a
competitive emissions trading program in the next section, section 3 contains an analysis of the
effects of risk aversion on compliance behavior. I first demonstrate that a firm’s decision about
whether to comply or not is independent of its manager’s risk preference. Thus, if the
enforcement objective is to achieve full compliance to an emissions trading program, the
distribution of risk preferences among the managers of firms has no bearing on the strategy
required to achieve this objective. Moreover, a targeted enforcement strategy with which firms
with certain characteristics are monitored more closely than others is not justified.
Risk preferences do play a role in determining the violations of noncompliant firms. Not
surprisingly, noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower violations than
otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers. However, the violations of noncompliant
firms with risk averse managers are independent of differences in their benefits from emissions
and their initial allocations of permits if and only their managers’ utility functions exhibit
constant absolute risk aversion. On the other hand, firm-level characteristics do impact violation
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choices when managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or
decreasing in profit levels.
In principle, therefore, a regulator could target its enforcement effort when there is
widespread noncompliance in an emissions trading program and firms’ managers are risk averse.
This targeting could be based directly on differences in the risk preferences of individual
managers, or indirectly on differences in the firms’ characteristics. However, a regulator must
have detailed information about managers’ risk preferences, including their coefficients of
absolute risk aversion. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that a regulator could screen individual
managers on the basis of their risk preferences. It also seems unlikely that a regulator could infer
this information from observed behavior. Thus, while a targeted monitoring strategy may be
justified when firm managers are risk averse, the information requirements for forming such a
strategy are rather severe.
Finally, it is important for regulators to understand how risk preferences affect the
performance of markets for pollution control. I examine the market effects of risk aversion in
section 4. Risk aversion will have no impact on rights markets when all firms are compliant, but
may have significant impacts when there is widespread noncompliance. In these cases, risk
aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental quality, and lower
aggregate violations.

2. A Model of Compliance under Emissions Trading
The analysis of this paper is largely based on a standard model of the decisions of a firm that
operates under a competitive emissions trading program. It is important to note that the model of
this paper can be applied to other tradable property rights programs with minor modifications. In
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fact, recent papers by Hatcher (2005) and Chavez and Salgado (2005) are direct applications of
the literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions trading to individual transferable
fishing quotas (ITQs). Thus the results of this paper apply to ITQ policies, as well as to other
policies that seek to limit some activity through a market for the rights to engage in the activity.
The firm’s benefit from emissions is b(q, α ), which is strictly concave in its emissions q.1

Absent an inducement to control its emissions, the amount of pollution the firm releases is the
solution to bq (q, α ) = 0 . Denote this value of q as q0, and let us limit the analysis to emissions
less than q0. For q < q 0 , bq (q, α ) > 0. One can think of bq (q, α ) as the firm’s marginal
abatement costs, because it reveals the firm’s reduction in profit from reducing its emissions by
one unit. Assume that the firm’s benefits from emissions are increasing in the parameter α so
that bα (q, α ) > 0. Parametric differences in firms’ benefits from emissions are captured by
differences in α .
The firm receives l0 permits initially and holds l permits after trading in a compliance
period is complete. Competitive behavior in the permit market establishes a constant price per
permit p. Net expenditure or revenue from trading in the permit market is p(l − l0 ).
If the firm is noncompliant, its emissions exceed the number of permits it holds and the
magnitude of its violation is v = q – l > 0. If the firm is compliant, q – l ≤ 0 and v = 0. To check
for compliance, the firm is audited with a known probability π and is assessed a penalty f (v) if it
is found to be noncompliant. There is no penalty for a zero violation, but the penalty is positive,
strictly increasing, and strictly convex for positive violations.

1

See Montgomery (1972) for a demonstration of the concavity of profit in emissions for firms that are price-takers
in input and output markets. Since the formulation of b(q, α ) is quite general, strict concavity can be guaranteed
in many non-competitive settings as well.
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Suppose that the manager of the firm is risk neutral or risk averse, and therefore has a
concave (perhaps weakly) utility function u. Given the monitoring uncertainty, the manager
choose the firm’s emissions, q, and violation, v = q – l, to maximize his or her expected utility of
profit
U ( w) = (1 − π ) u ( w0 ) + π u ( w1 ),

[1]

w0 = b(q, α ) − p(q − v − l0 ),

[2]

w1 = b(q, α ) − p (q − v − l0 ) − f (v). 2

[3]

where

and

Assuming that the firm has positive emissions, its level of emissions is determined by the
first-order condition,
∂U ( w) / ∂q = ⎡⎣(1 − π )u′( w0 ) + π u ′( w1 ) ⎤⎦ ( bq (q, α ) − p ) = 0,
which holds if and only if bq (q, α ) = p. That is, the manager chooses the firm’s emissions so that
the marginal benefit from increased emissions is equal to the prevailing permit price. Note that
this choice depends only on the emissions benefit parameter α and the going permit price p.
Therefore, let us write the firm’s optimal emissions as q = q (α , p). Our results about firms’
emissions choices are summarized in our first proposition:

2

This description of a manager’s payoff function is easily modified to analyze compliance to an emissions tax
(Malik 1990). To do so, let l be the firm’s report of its emissions, let p be the fixed unit tax on emissions, and set
l0 = 0 to reflect the fact that a firm is required to pay for each unit of emissions. The results of this section and the

next are obtained under the assumption of a fixed permit price. (In section 4 the permit price is determined
endogenously so that we can examine the market effects of risk aversion.) Therefore, all of the results of these two
sections, except those involving the effects of l0 , can be directly applied to an analysis of compliance behavior
under a fixed emissions tax. Recent papers that investigate compliance behavior under an emissions tax include
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2005), and Sandmo (2002). Only Sandmo allows for risk aversion, but he
does not analyze the effects of risk aversion and firm characteristics on compliance behavior, which is the main
topic of this paper.
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Proposition 1: A firm’s choice of emissions is independent of its manager’s risk preference, its

endowment of permits, and the enforcement strategy it faces.3

These independence results are not new. Malik (1990) appears to have been the first to derive
them in the case of emissions trading. See Harford (1978) and Sandmo (2002) for similar results
in the case of an emissions tax.
That a firm’s choice of emissions is independent of its manager’s risk preference, its
initial allocation of permits, and the enforcement strategy imply that a competitive permit market
will maximize an industry’s aggregate benefits from emissions when aggregate emissions are
held to be no more than some fixed standard. In other words, a competitive emissions trading
policy will minimize an industry’s aggregate costs of holding its emissions to a fixed standard.4
However, there are situations in which Proposition 1 will fail to hold, yielding an inefficient
distribution of pollution rights. Obviously, the assumption of competitive permit trading is
crucial.5 Furthermore, Malik (1990) has shown that if a noncompliant firm’s subjective
probability of detection is π i (ei , li ) , with ∂π i ∂ei + ∂π i ∂li ≠ 0 , then it chooses its emissions so
that its marginal benefit from emissions differs from the permit price. If this is the case, then it is
3

This last independence results does not imply that equilibrium levels of emissions are independent of the
enforcement strategy. Enforcement will have an indirect effect on equilibrium emissions through the permit price.
However, given a permit price, each firms’ choice of emissions are independent of the enforcement strategy it
faces. Murphy and Stranlund (2006) use laboratory experiments of emissions trading when subjects can be
noncompliant to confirm the zero direct effect of enforcement on emissions, and a negative indirect effect through
the impact of enforcement on permit prices.

4

This has always been an important objective for analysts and policy makers alike. Montgomery’s (1972) seminal
work on the efficiency of competitive emissions trading takes this approach, as have many papers that have
followed in the literature on emissions trading. Moreover, the ability of competitive markets to distribute
emissions control responsibilities efficiently is the main justification for the widespread implementation of these
markets.

5

See van Egteren and Weber (1996), Malik (2002), and Chavez and Stranlund (2003) for analyses of compliance
behavior under emissions trading programs in the presence of market power.
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unlikely that aggregate benefits from emissions will be maximized. In this paper the detection
probability a firm faces is common knowledge between the firm and the regulator, and is
independent of the firm’s permit demand and choice of emissions.
We can now turn to a firm’s compliance decision, given its optimal choice of emissions.
Since the condition under which the firm is compliant is an important aspect of this study, its
violation choice needs to be constrained to be non-negative. The first-order condition for the
violation level that maximizes [1] subject to this constraint is

∂U ( w) / ∂v = (1 − π )u′( w0 ) p + π u′( w1 )( p − f v (v)) ≤ 0, if < 0, then v = 0.
This condition can be rewritten as:
p − π f v (v) R(v, α , l0 , π , p) ≤ 0, if < 0, then v = 0,

[4]

where
R (v, α , l0 , π , p) = u′( w1 ) ⎡⎣ (1 − π )u′( w0 ) + π u′( w1 ) ⎤⎦ = u ′( w1 ) U ′( w).

[5]

The implicit solution to [4] is the firm’s optimal violation, which is denoted
v = v (α , l0 , π , p ).

[6]

The second order condition that guarantees that [4] identifies a unique optimal violation
requires that π f v (v) R(v, α , l0 , π , p) is strictly increasing in v. That is, f vv R + f v Rv > 0. It is
straightforward to demonstrate that this condition holds as long as the firm’s manager is not a
risk seeker. The consequences of risk seeking behavior are not examined in this paper. Note that
I have written R (v, α , l0 , π , p) as being independent of the firm’s level of emissions, q (α , p ) .
This follows from the fact that w1q = wq0 = bq (q , α ) − p = 0 , which implies Rq = 0 .
R (v, α , l0 , π , p) is an adjustment of the marginal expected penalty, π f v (v) , that accounts
for the manager’s attitude toward risk. If the manager is risk neutral, his or her utility function is
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linear, implying that u′( w1 ) = u ′( w0 ) and R = 1. If the firm is compliant, R = 1 as well, because

w0 = w1. However, if the manager is risk averse, his or her utility function is strictly concave.
Therefore, if the firm is noncompliant, then w0 > w1 and u′( w1 ) > u ′( w0 ) . Since
(1 − π )u ′( w0 ) + π u ′( w1 ) is a linear combination of u′( w1 ) and u ′( w0 ) ,
u′( w1 ) > (1 − π )u′( w0 ) + π u′( w1 ) . This implies that R > 1 for a noncompliant firm with a risk
averse manager.
In the case of risk neutrality, it is straightforward to demonstrate Stranlund and Dhanda’s
(1999) result that the decision to comply and the choice of violation level are independent of any
firm-specific characteristics. From [4] it is straightforward to establish that a firm with a risk
neutral manager is compliant if and only if p ≤ π f v (0) ; that is, a firm is compliant if and only if
the permit price is not greater than marginal expected penalty of a slight violation. Note that the
firm’s benefits of pollution, as reflected in the parameter α , and its initial allocation of permits,
l0 , do not affect this decision rule. Therefore, a manager’s decision about whether the firm
should be in compliance is independent of these parameters. This independence extends to the
violation level of a noncompliant firm as well. To see this, let [4] hold with equality, set R = 1
and substitute the firm’s optimal violation [6] to obtain p − π f v (v (α , l0 , π , p)) ≡ 0. Differentiate
this identity with respect to α to obtain −π f vv vα = 0, which implies vα = 0. This result indicates
that firms’ violations are independent of parametric differences in their benefits from emissions
when their managers are risk neutral. The same is true for differences in firms’ initial permit
allocations.
Therefore, as long as managers are risk neutral, there is no reason for regulators to
believe that some firms will be more likely to be noncompliant, or tend toward higher violations,

10

even though they may have very different benefits from emissions or initial permit allocations.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the marginal productivity of increased enforcement
in reducing violations will differ among firms. Hence, a regulator that is motivated to target its
enforcement resources to reduce incidences of noncompliance cannot do so on the basis of firmlevel characteristics when managers are risk neutral. In the next section I examine whether this
result continues to hold when managers are risk averse.

3. Risk Aversion and Compliance Behavior

In this section let us analyze the compliance behavior of firms when their managers are risk
averse. We begin with a firm’s decision to be compliant or not. Perhaps surprisingly, a
manager’s risk preference has no bearing on whether his or her firm will be compliant. That is,
regardless of the manager’s attitude toward risk, the firm is compliant if and only if p ≤ π f v (0) .
To prove the “only if” part of this assertion, first note that if v = 0, then w0 = w1 and R = 1. From
[4], then, it is clear that v = 0 requires p ≤ π f v (0) . To prove that v = 0 if p ≤ π f v (0) , recall that
the second order condition for the determination of v requires that π f v (v) R is strictly increasing
in v. This and R = 1 when v = 0 imply π f v (v) R > π f v (0) for v > 0 . In turn, if p ≤ π f v (0) , then
p − π f v (v) R < 0 for v > 0 . From [4], however, p − π f v (v) R < 0 for v > 0 implies that the
optimal choice of violation is v = 0. Therefore, we conclude that v = 0 if p ≤ π f v (0) .
Since a manager’s decision about whether his or her firm should comply depends only on
the prevailing permit price and the enforcement strategy, we have the following proposition:
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Proposition 2: A firm is compliant if and only if p ≤ π f v (0) . Therefore, whether a firm is

compliant or not is independent of its benefits from emissions, its endowment of permits, and its
manager’s risk preference.

Proposition 2 implies that firms with risk averse managers are not more (or less) likely to
be compliant than firms with risk neutral managers. This result has important implications.
Suppose that a regulator’s objective is to use its enforcement strategy to induce full compliance
to an emissions trading policy. One may suspect that it would be easier to induce full compliance
by firms with risk averse managers than to induce compliance by firms with risk neutral
managers, but this is clearly not the case. That a firm’s decision to comply or not is also
independent of its benefit from emissions and its initial allocation of permits implies that a
regulator with the objective of inducing complete compliance should not pursue a targeted
monitoring strategy. Minimizing the enforcement costs of inducing full compliance implies
uniform monitoring of firms so that p = π f v (0) .
While a firm with a risk averse manager is not more likely to be noncompliant than a firm
with a risk neutral manager, a noncompliant firm with a risk averse manager will choose a lower
violation than an otherwise identical noncompliant firm with a risk neutral manager. This follows
from the fact that R = 1 for a risk neutral manager and R > 1 for a risk averse manager; that is,
the expected marginal disutility of being penalized for a particular violation level is higher for a
risk averse manager than for a risk neutral manager. In principle, with information on the risk
preferences of individual managers, a regulator could target its enforcement effort based on this
information. However, it seems unlikely that a regulator could categorize or screen managers on
the basis of their risk preferences.
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There remains the possibility, however, that a regulator can use observable information
that is correlated with firms’ benefits from emissions to target its monitoring effort when firms
have risk averse managers. This information may include observable characteristics of
production technologies, levels of inputs and outputs, abatement equipment, or their initial
allocations of permits. To determine whether it is possible for a regulator to do this, we need to
determine whether a firm’s violation depends on the parameter α , or on its initial allocation of
permits, l0 . Using [4] and [6], write the identity
p − π f v (v ) R(v , α , l0 , π , p ) ≡ 0 .

[7]

From [7] obtain vθ = − Rθ f v S , where θ ∈ (α , l0 ) and S = f vv R + f v Rv > 0 , which is required by
the second order condition for determining an optimal violation. Since f v > 0 , the sign of vθ is
equal to the sign of − Rθ . Using [5], one can calculate
− Rα = Abα ⎡⎣ −u ′′( w1 ) u′( w1 ) + u′′( w0 ) u′( w0 ) ⎤⎦ ,

[8]

− Rl0 = Ap ⎡⎣ −u′′( w1 ) u′( w1 ) + u ′′( w0 ) u′( w0 ) ⎤⎦ ,

[9]

and

where A = (1 − π )u ′( w1 )u ′( w0 ) [U ′( w) ] > 0. Since bα > 0 , − Rα and − Rl0 have the same sign as
2

−u′′( w1 ) u′( w1 ) + u ′′( w0 ) u ′( w0 ) . Therefore, vα and vl0 have the same sign as this term as well.
However, −u ′′( w) u ′( w) is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the
sign of − u ′′( w1 ) u′( w1 ) + u′′( w0 ) u′( w0 ) is simply a statement of whether the manager’s utility
function exhibits decreasing, constant, or increasing absolute risk aversion (Mas-Colell,et.al.
1995, pg. 193). Since from [2] and [3], w0 > w1 , if the manager’s utility function exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then −u′′( w1 ) u′( w1 ) + u′′( w0 ) u′( w0 ) > 0. With constant
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absolute risk aversion this term is equal to zero, and with increasing absolute risk aversion this
term is negative. Therefore, for a noncompliant firm with a risk averse manager we have the
following proposition:

Proposition 3: The violation of a noncompliant firm with a risk averse manager is independent

of its benefits from emissions and its endowment of permits if and only if the manager’s utility
function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion. If the manager’s utility function exhibits
decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion, the firm’s violation is increasing (decreasing) in
its benefits from emissions and its endowment of permits.

Violation levels of noncompliant firms are independent of parametric differences in their
benefits from emissions and in their initial allocations of permits if the firms’ managers have
utility functions that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. This is a generalization of Stranlund
and Dhanda’s (1999) independence result that they obtained under the assumption of risk neutral
managers. However, these results do not hold with non-constant absolute risk aversion. A firm’s
violation is increasing (decreasing) in its benefits from emissions and its initial allocation of
permits if and only if its manager’s utility exhibits decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion.
Managers with decreasing absolute risk aversion take on more risk as their firms become more
profitable. Given a choice of emissions and permit demand, a higher value of α or a larger
initial allocation of permits both imply that a firm is more profitable. If the firm’s manager has
decreasing absolute risk aversion, then higher values of these parameters (higher profitability)
lead the manager to take on more risk, and hence, to choose a higher violation. The opposite is
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true if the manager has increasing absolute risk aversion, because then he or she is motivated to
take on less risk when the firm is more profitable.
The policy implication of Proposition 3 is that firms’ violations are not independent of
their benefits from emissions or initial allocations if their managers are risk averse with utility
functions that exhibit non-constant absolute risk aversion. In principle, then, a regulator would be
able to form a targeted monitoring strategy based on observable differences in firm’s initial
allocations of permits and on characteristics that determine their benefits from emissions. To do
so, however, requires rather detailed information about individual managers’ risk preferences. It
is important to note that it is simply not enough know, or assume, that managers are risk averse.
If risk averse managers have constant absolute risk aversion, there is no justification for a
targeted monitoring strategy that is based on firm-level characteristics. A targeted strategy is
justified only when a regulator knows whether managers have increasing or decreasing absolute
risk aversion. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that a regulator could ever obtain this
information, or infer it from observations of firm behavior. Thus, although a targeted monitoring
strategy may be justified when firm managers are risk averse, the information requirements for
forming such a strategy are rather severe.

4. Market Effects of Risk Aversion

Up to this point the analysis has been conducted under the assumption of a fixed price for
emissions rights. However, any analysis of compliance behavior under tradable property rights
must ultimately make the price of these rights endogenous. Perhaps the most important reason
for doing so is that firms’ compliance choices are linked together by the market for property
rights. This is one of the features of market-based environmental and natural resource policies
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that distinguish them from command-and-control regulations and from taxes.
Let us consider the following thought experiment. Start from a situation in which all the
firms in an emissions trading program are noncompliant and all their managers are risk neutral.
Then, let us replace a significant number, but not all, of the firms’ managers with risk averse
managers. Doing so allows us to trace out the effects of risk aversion on the equilibrium permit
price, aggregate emissions, aggregate violations, as well as the violations of the firms with their
new risk averse managers and the violations of those that keep their risk neutral managers.
Suppose that a fixed number of emissions permits are in circulation, and that when all the
managers are risk neutral, all firms violate their permits so that aggregate emissions exceed the
number of permits in circulation. Now replace a significant number of the firms’ managers with
risk averse individuals. Recall that risk averse managers will choose lower violations for their
firms than their risk neutral counterparts. Thus, holding the permit price constant, the firms that
acquire a risk averse manager will reduce their violations. In principle, these firms could reduce
their violations by purchasing more permits or by reducing their emissions. However, recall that
a firm’s level of emissions is independent of its manager’s preference for risk (Proposition 1).
Therefore, holding the permit price constant, firms with risk averse managers will reduce their
violations by demanding more permits, not by reducing their emissions.
Clearly the increased permit demand by the firms who now have risk averse managers
will increase the equilibrium permit price. In response to this increase in the permit price, all
firms will reduce their emissions. To see why, recall that a firm’s choice of emissions,
q = q (α , p) , is determined from the first-order condition bq (q, α ) = p. From this condition
obtain q p = 1/ bqq < 0, which implies that each firms’ emissions are decreasing in the price of
emissions permits. Thus, relative to a situation involving noncompliant firms with risk neutral

16

managers, replacing a significant number of these managers with risk averse individuals will
induce a higher equilibrium permit price and lower aggregate emissions. Of course, given a fixed
supply of emissions permits, lower aggregate emissions imply lower aggregate violations. We
conclude, therefore, that under market-based environmental policies with widespread
noncompliance, risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental
quality, and higher aggregate compliance.
However, higher aggregate compliance does not imply lower violations by all firms. In
fact, a significant number of risk averse managers will lead to higher violations by the firms with
risk neutral managers. To demonstrate this, recall that equation [7] is the first-order condition for
a positive violation by a firm evaluated at its optimal violation v (α , l0 , π , p ) . Also recall that if
the firm’s manager is risk neutral, then R (v , α , l0 , π , p) = 1 . From p − π f v (v ) ≡ 0 , then, obtain
v p = 1/ π f vv > 0, which indicates that the violation of a firm with a risk neutral manager is
increasing in the price of permits. Since a significant number of risk averse managers will tend to
push the equilibrium permit price up because they demand more permits, their behavior will also
lead the firms with risk neutral managers to increase their violations.
Our conclusions about the effects of risk aversion on transferable permit market
outcomes are summarized in our final proposition.

Proposition 4: Relative to a market involving noncompliant firms with risk neutral managers, an

otherwise identical market but with a significant number of risk averse managers will have (1) a
higher equilibrium permit price, (2) lower emissions by all firms, (3) lower aggregate violations,
but (4) higher violations by the firms with risk neutral managers.
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In contrast, risk aversion will have no impact on permit markets when all firms are
compliant. That is, suppose we started from a situation involving compliant firms with risk
neutral managers. Replacing some or all of the managers with risk averse managers will have no
affect on equilibrium outcomes, because these new managers will also choose compliance for
their firms. This follows from Proposition 2, which states that a firm’s decision to be compliant
is independent of the risk preference of its manager.
Therefore, the market effects of risk aversion are limited to situations involving
widespread noncompliance. In these cases, risk aversion produces better environmental quality
and lower aggregate violations. However, regulators need to always be aware of indirect price
effects under tradable rights regulations. The lower violations of firms with risk averse managers
puts upward pressure on the market price of rights, which in turn motivates firms with risk
neutral managers toward higher violations.

5. Conclusion

We have examined the consequences of risk aversion on compliance behavior in markets for
pollution control, and have obtained several new results with significant policy implications.
First, a firm’s decision about whether to comply or not is independent of its manager’s risk
preference; that is, firms with risk averse managers are not more (or less) likely to be compliant
than firms with risk neutral (or even risk loving) managers. Thus, if the objective of a regulator is
to enforce an emissions trading policy so that all firms that operate under the policy are fully
compliant, the distribution of risk preferences among the managers of the firms has no bearing
on what is required to achieve this objective. Moreover, one cannot justify a targeted
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enforcement strategy that involves monitoring firms with certain characteristics more closely
than others.
However, risk preferences do play a role in determining the violation levels of
noncompliant firms. While noncompliant firms with risk averse managers will have lower
violations than otherwise identical firms with risk neutral managers, the effects of differences in
firms’ emissions benefits and their initial permit allocations on their violation choices depend
critically on their managers’ coefficients of absolute risk aversion. A firm’s violation is
independent of these characteristics if its manager’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is
constant over profit levels. However, higher (lower) violations are associated with higher (lower)
emissions benefits and initial permit allocations when a manager’s coefficient of absolute risk
aversion is decreasing (increasing) in profit levels.
In principle, a regulator could target its enforcement effort based directly on the risk
preferences of individual managers, or indirectly on differences in the firms’ characteristics.
However, doing so requires that there is significant noncompliance to an emissions trading
policy. Moreover, the regulator must have detailed information about managers’ risk preferences,
including whether their utility functions exhibit increasing, decreasing, or constant absolute risk
aversion. Although a targeted monitoring strategy may be justified when firm managers are risk
averse, the information requirements for forming such a strategy appear prohibitive.
It is important, however, for regulators to understand how risk preferences affect the
performance of tradable rights regulations. We have seen that risk aversion will have no impact
on markets for pollution control when all firms are compliant, but may have significant impacts
when there is widespread noncompliance. In these cases, risk aversion is associated with higher
permit prices, lower aggregate violations, and better environmental quality.
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